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LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR WEST AFRICAN
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Iwa Akinrinsola*
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE
COLONIAL ERA
FTER the scramble for Africa in 1881 by the Europeans, Africa
was split into parts and governed by European countries. Brit-
ain and France governed the region that is now known as West
Africa.' These imperial powers governed their West African colonies
under Colonial Constitutions, which enabled the imperial government to
control all aspects of their colonies, including colonial monetary and cur-
rency arrangements.
Regional economic integration can be traced to when the British and
French governments individually administered one currency arrangement
for their respective West African colonies. After 1882, in the case of Brit-
ish West Africa, a number of currencies were recognized as legal tender;
however, the British silver coin was the predominant currency.2 By 1892,
the British colonial government ensured that British silver was the main
currency used in anglophone West Africa. However, due to the short-
comings of the British silver currency system in 1912, the West Africa
Currency Board (WACB) was created to administer the currency system
of British West Africa.3 The WACB operated under a very rigid regula-
*Doctorate student at the International Financial Law Unit, Centre for Commercial
Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London (i.akinrinsola@qmul.ac.
uk). The author wishes to thank Dr. Rosa Lastra and Professor Joseph Norton for
helpful comments and suggestions. This article is the opinion of the author and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of Dr. Lastra or Professor Norton.
1. In the colonial era, these regions were described as British and French West
Africa.
2. See lwa Akinrinsola, Monetary Integration in West Africa, 5 J. INT'L BANKING
REG. 21, 22 (2003). In this paper, the author gives a historical account of the cur-
rency system in anglophone West Africa. This paper analyzes the operation of the
WACB and provides a comparison between it and the British Silver coin system.
3. Under this system, the WACB could only issue currency in West Africa after a
head office bank in London had paid sterling, plus a small commission to the
WACB. The WACB was then under an obligation to instruct its currency officers
in West Africa to issue the equivalent amount to the local branch of such a bank
less the commission. It was also under an obligation, if a bank branch in West
Africa lodged coins or notes with one of its currency officers to pay the equivalent
amount, less the same commission, to the head office of the bank in London.
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tory framework. The WACB was abolished on the eve of the indepen-
dence of the British colonies because the West African colonies believed
that full national sovereignty could not be achieved without monetary
sovereignty. Although West Africans deemed the currency board ex-
ploitative, 4 its long life span (1912 - 1956) was attributed to its well-regu-
lated framework.
The situation was slightly different in French West Africa. Similar to
Britain, France administered a single currency regime for her colonies,
but this arrangement continued after independence. Today, France ad-
ministers the currency system in francophone West Africa, a region that
previously had its currency pegged to the French Franc, but now has it
tied to the Euro.5
II. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION EFFORTS
AFTER INDEPENDENCE
After independence, the idea of forming a regional West African eco-
nomic community amongst the Anglophone West African states did not
appeal to them. This was not surprising, as they were not quick to forget
their colonial experience and remembered the exploitive operation of the
WACB. As a result, regional cooperation was not considered until al-
most a decade after independence. 6 The idea of regional integration be-
gan to gain ground because the economies of these nations were being
increasingly marginalized on the international front.
A. THE ECOWAS ERA
The very first attempt at regional integration, which purported to cover
the entire West African region, was the West African Clearing House
(WACH). The WACH agreement was signed in July 1975. WACH's aim
was to promote the use of the currencies of the Clearing House members
for intra-regional trade.7 However, this integration failed largely due to
Thus, the WACB was merely a body whose role was strictly to exchange currency
from West African sterling to British sterling and vice versa.
4. W. OKEFIE UZOAGA, MONEY AND BANKING IN NIGERIA 47 - 49 (Fourth Dimen-
sion Publishers 1981).
5. For more on the currency arrangement in francophone West Africa after the intro-
duction of the Euro, see MICHAEL T. HADJIMICHAEL & MICHAEL GALY, THE
CFA FRANC ZONE AND THE EMU (International Monetary Fund (IMF), Working
Paper No. WP/97/156, 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
wp97156.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2004); PAUL R. MASSON & CATHERINE A. PAT-
TILLO, MONETARY UNION IN WEST AFRICA: AN AGENCY OF RESTRAINT FOR FIs-
CAL POLICIES? (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/01/34, 2001), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0134.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
6. However, there were various forms of regional cooperation happening in the
francophone West African states, the most popular of them being the West African
Monetary Union.
7. Association of African Central Banks, Guidelines for the Creation of a Clearing
Arrangement Between Member States of the Sub-Regional Committee (1973)
(unpublished), cited in CHIBUIKE U. UCHE, THE POLITICS OF MONETARY SECTOR
COOPERATION AMONG THE ECOWAS MEMBER STATES 36 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper, 2001).
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non-compliance by Member States with the articles of agreement. 8
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was a
more formal arrangement. The Treaty of ECOWAS was signed in Lagos
on May 28, 1975, by Benin (formerly Dahomey), Burkina Faso (Formerly
Upper Volta), Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Li-
beria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
It envisioned a closer economic relationship between West African
States. This Treaty was the first attempt at creating a formal regional
group, covering the entire West African region.9
The ECOWAS era is analysed in two periods. The first time period
marks the period from the commencement of the organization in 1975,
until the revision of its treaty in 1993. The second time period, from 1993
to the present, marks the period from the revision of the original treaty to
its most recent operations and initiatives.
1. ECOWAS From 1975 - 1993 (The Original Treaty Provisions)
The aim of ECOWAS under the 1975 Treaty' 0 was to promote cooper-
ation in all fields of economic activity in order to increase and maintain
economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members, and con-
tributing to the progress and development of the African continent."'
The Treaty sought to achieve this goal in stages by achieving a number
of smaller goals, 12 including the establishment of a customs union 13 and
the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
vices, and capital.14
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FAILURES TO ACHIEVE
TREATY OBJECTIVES
1. Free Movement of Goods
As noted in the ECOWAS Treaty, one of the aims of the organization
was to establish the free movement of goods. 15 This process was to be
8. JOHN B. MCLENAGHAN ET AL., CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY IN THE ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 24 (IMF, Occasional Paper No. 13, 1982).
9. The anglophone group was comprised of Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nige-
ria. The francophone group was comprised of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
and Liberia were the three states that did not belong to any of the groups.
10. Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States, May 28,
1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. 18 [hereinafter ECOWAS Treaty 1975].
11. Id. art. 2(1), at 20.
12. Id. art. 2(2).
13. Id. art. 2(2)(a)-(c).
14. Id. art. 2(2)(d).
15. Id. arts. 12-13, at 24-25.
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achieved by the creation of a free trade area 16 and a customs union 17
between the Member States. The free trade area was to be established
within ten years from the commencement.of the Treaty, 18 and the cus-
toms union created within fifteen years.19 These aims were to be attained
through a process called the Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS). 20
Under the TLS, certain arrangements were established to promote the
creation of a free trade area. These included the gradual elimination of
Member State customs duties and related charges, along with discrimina-
tory or protectionist internal taxes. The TLS also eliminated non-tariff
quantitative restrictions and similar barriers to the free flow of goods.21
a. Liberalization of Trade in Unprocessed Goods
Unprocessed goods were to circulate freely between Member States.
They were to be exempt from duties and equivalent taxes and were to be
free from quantitative and administrative restrictions in Member States.22
Of all sixteen Member States, only eight lifted tariff barriers in respect to
unprocessed products under the TLS.23
b. Liberalization of Trade in Industrialized Products
The TLS also sought a gradual reduction of customs duties and
equivalent taxes on industrialized products.2 4 Total elimination of such
duties and taxes was to be achieved within ten years from the commence-
ment of the ECOWAS 1975 Treaty.25 The removal of non-tariff barriers
on such goods was also planned. Only one of the sixteen Member
States2 6 has removed tariff barriers to trade in industrial products.27
The failure of Member States to comply with the TLS provisions
clearly defeats the accomplishment of a free trade area among the states.
One of the reasons for non-compliance by states was that the income
generated from customs duties and tariffs constituted their main source
of revenue, and Member States were, therefore, not keen on giving up
16. Article 12 of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty provided for the progressive elimination
of customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect. Quota, quantitative
or like restrictions or prohibitions, and administrative obstacles to trade among the
Member States shall also be removed.
17. Article 14 of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty provided for the creation of a customs
union. This is an area where free trade exists and a common external tariff towards
third states exists among members.
18. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 13(3), 1010 U.N.T.S. at 25.
19. Id. art. 12, at 24.
20. Id.
21. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW 317 (West Publishing Co. 1993).
22. See ECOWAS Official website, at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2004) [hereinafter ECOWAS website].
23. The countries include Benin, Cote dIvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone. Id.
24. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 13(1), 1010 U.N.T.S. at 24.
25. Id. art. 13(3), at 25.
26. The reference is to Benin. ECOWAS website, supra note 22.
27. Id.
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this revenue source.28 The ECOWAS Fund, another ECOWAS institu-
tion, was designed to cater to this, but it failed to do so. 29
c. Printing and Introduction of the Harmonized Customs
Documents
In furtherance of the TLS's aim, uniform customs and statistical instru-
ments were to be introduced in all Member States.30 These instruments
include the certificate of origin, the customs and statistical nomenclature,
and the customs declaration. However, not all countries have imple-
mented these documents and procedures. Only twelve countries are us-
ing the certificate of origin, and only eleven Member States adopted the
customs and statistical nomenclature and the customs declaration. 31 The
non-implementation of these procedures by some states hampers the
smooth operation of the TLS and frustrates trade between countries that
have implemented them and those that have not.32 The long-run effect of
this fractured implementation is the delay, or worse, the non-attainment
of a free trade area and a customs union.
d. Establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff
The common external tariff was in furtherance of the creation of a cus-
toms union, another TLS aim. This aim requires the establishment of a
free trade area among the Member States and the establishment of a
common external tariff toward third-party states. Since Member States
have been unable to establish a free trade area,33 it is unlikely that the
establishment of a common external tariff toward third-party states is at-
tainable for the same reasons stated above. Therefore, the establishment
of a customs union is improbable for the near future.
2. Free Movement of Persons34
The free movement of persons is a primary criterion for determining
whether a common market is established. The achievement of this goal
28. MCLENAGHAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 20.
29. This Fund was established to cater for states that had suffered, as a result of the
operation of ECOWAS schemes.
30. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 14(3), 1010 U.N.T.S. at 25.
31. The countries using the certificates of origin include Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo. ECOWAS website, supra note 22. The eleven countries are Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo. Id.
32. K.O. Kufuor, The Framework for Capital Movements Within the Economic Com-
munity of West African States, 3 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 239, 240 (1995).
33. MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Asso-
CIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIREcTORS ON A REGIONAL ASSISTANCE STRATEGY
FOR WEST AFRICA 9 (World Bank, Report No. 22520-AFR, 2001) [hereinafter
World Bank Report].
34. ECOWAS website, supra note 22.
2004]
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was a step forward in realizing the long-term goal of a common market. 35
In order to achieve this goal, the Member States agreed to implement
certain provisions.
a. Abolition of Visas and Entry Permits
To give effect to the Treaty provision on the free movement of persons,
the Head of States signed a protocol. 36 This protocol included the aboli-
tion of visas and entry permits, right of residence, and the right of estab-
lishment for citizens of ECOWAS Member States.37 This provision gave
all ECOWAS citizens the right to reside in any Member State for a maxi-
mum of ninety days, subject to producing valid travel documents and in-
ternational vaccine certificates. Also, under article 5 of the protocol,
vehicles from one state could freely enter and remain in the territory of
another state for a period not exceeding ninety days, subject to valid
documentation.
All ECOWAS members abolished their visa and entry requirements.
However, most still retain copious checkpoints, and citizens continuously
experience various forms of administrative harassment as they cross
member country borders. For example, the 992 kilometer journey be-
tween Lagos and Abidjan has seven checkpoints. 38 Although the de jure
state of affairs for the free movement of persons is that all visas and entry
requirements are abolished, the de facto position is that disruptions to the
free movement of persons within ECOWAS states remain. The goals re-
lated to the free movement of persons were to be fully achieved within
fifteen years of the protocol's entry into force in 1979, which would have
been in 1994.39 However, the free movement of persons has not truly
been achieved within the region.
b. Introduction of ECOWAS Travel Certificate
A system of travel certificates was implemented to simplify movement
from state to state.40 Not all states have these certificates, in part, be-
cause of the high cost of producing them, which is the primary reason for
35. Although the original Treaty did not specifically provide for the creation of a com-
mon market, this goal could be deduced from the aims of the original treaty. How-
ever, the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty specifically mentioned this as an aim in article
3(2)(d). Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, July
24, 1993, art. 3(2)(d), 35 I.L.M. 660, 666-67 [hereinafter ECOWAS Treaty 1993].
36. ECOWAS Treaty Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Res-
idence and Establishment, May 29, 1979, cited in AN ECOWAS COMPENDIUM ON
FREE MOVEMENT, RIGrr OF RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT (ECOWAS 1999),
available at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/ap1O579.htm [hereinaf-
ter Protocol].
37. Id. art. 2, at 2.
38. See ECOWAS website, supra note 22.
39. Protocol, supra note 36, art. 2, at 1.
40. ECOWAS Decision A/DEC.2/7/85 Relating to the Establishment of the ECOWAS
Travel Certificate for Member States, July 6, 1985, art. 1, cited in AN ECOWAS
COMPENDIUM ON FREE MOVEMENT, RIGHT OF RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT
21 (ECOWAS 1999).
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the delay in their circulation among poorer states. The states are optimis-
tic that this system will enhance the free movement of persons and be
synonymous to the free movement of persons regime under the Euro-
pean Union. However, even if these certificates are issued, bureaucratic
burdens and corruption must be avoided. For example, renewing a
Nigerian passport can take a couple of months or more due to bureau-
cratic procedures, which is typical of most other African countries.41The
promotion of the free movement of persons through this travel certifi-
cates scheme has, therefore, proven unsuccessful.
c. Launching of New ECOWAS Passport
In furtherance of attaining the free movement of persons objective, the
ECOWAS passport was launched on December 18, 2003. Time will de-
termine the effectiveness of its operation. Given the slow pace of fulfil-
ling the 1979 protocol and the existing inhibitions to the free movement
of persons within the region, the ECOWAS passport will not likely oper-
ate as effectively as prescribed. 42 Also, because the process of issuing
passports within Member States is cumbersome, Member States may be
unable to coordinate the issuance of a single ECOWAS passport for their
citizens.
The passport, which has electronic features, requires hi-tech infrastruc-
tures for its operation. Thus far, Nigeria has invested $138 million (about
N19.320 billion) for financing and issuing passports to Nigerians. 43 The
poorer Member States could not finance the ECOWAS travel certificate,
and will likely have difficulty financing the passport venture, since the
Travel Certificate was a smaller scale project.44If the inability of poorer
states to finance the ECOWAS travel certificate negatively affected the
implementation of the free movement of persons provisions, then the
same is likely for the ECOWAS passport.
3. The Free Movement of Services / The Right of Establishment
A third protocol 45 was passed to commence the third phase of the Free
Movement of Persons (the right of establishment) Protocol. 46 Under this
provision, Member States are required to grant ECOWAS citizens the
41. This has been the writer's personal experience and the experiences of personal
acquaintances of the writer who have recently tried to renew a Nigerian passport.
42. Emmanuel Aziken, $138m Earmarked for ECOWAS Passport, NIGERIAN VAN-
GUARD, Jan. 2, 2004, available at http://www.news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/
2004/jan/02/0067.html. Aziken enumerates the technicalities for the operation of
the passport within Nigeria.
43. Id.
44. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 18, 1010 U.N.T.S. at 26-27.
45. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/5/90 on the Implementation of the Third Phase
(Right of Establishment) of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of
Residence and Establishment, May 30, 1990, cited in AN ECOWAS COMPENDIUM
ON FREE MOVEMENT, RIGHT OF RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT 35 (ECOWAS
1999) [hereinafter Supplementary Protocol].
46. Protocol, supra note 36, art. 2, at 2.
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right to establish businesses in any Member State.47 This right includes
the creation and management of enterprises and companies, which com-
ply with host country regulatory standards. Although this provision has
become effective, 48 its implementation still remains poor in Member
States.49 This has negatively affected the free movement of services
within ECOWAS.
4. Free Movement of Capital
The free movement of capital is essential to achieving a common mar-
ket and was one of the aims of ECOWAS.50 However, at the establish-
ment of ECOWAS in 1975, the achievement of the free movement of
capital was not as important as the establishment of a free trade area and
a customs union. As a result, the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty limited its
achievement to the operation of a regional stock exchange. 51 At the sign-
ing of the Treaty, only two states52 had stock exchanges, and they were in
early stages of development. Thus, it was not surprising that achieving a
regional stock exchange was unsuccessful.
Between 1975 to 1993, before the treaty revision, no free movement of
capital among ECOWAS states occurred.5 3 Hence, the 1993 Revised
Treaty focused more on establishing national stock exchanges, rather
than a regional one. 54 The 1993 revision reiterated the provisions of the
1975 Treaty related to the work of the Capital Issues Committee 55 in pro-
moting the free movement of capital through the operation of stock
exchanges. 56
III. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AT THE
ECOWAS REGIONAL LEVEL: AN EU &
WAEMU COMPARISON
A. INTRODUCTION
This section discusses the reasons for the failure to achieve the 1975
Treaty's objectives and attributes these failures to inadequate regional ar-
rangements, both legal and institutional. This section also provides a
47. Supplementary Protocol, supra note 45, art. 3, at 38.
48. D. ZIMMER, FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE WITHIN THE AFRICAN UNION 8 (2004),
available at http://www.worldmun.org/2005/archives/04/gAU.pdf (last visited Aug.
30, 2004).
49. Id.
50. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 2(2)(b), 1010 U.N.T.S. at 20 (stating that
obstacles to the free movement of capital between Member States were to be
abolished).
51. Id. art. 53, at 37.
52. The two states are Ghana and Nigeria. ECOWAS website, supra note 22.
53. The free movement of capital however existed among the francophone states.
These states shared the same currency, which was pegged to the French Franc.
54. ECOWAS Treaty 1993, supra note 35, art. 53(3)(a)(ii), 35 I.L.M. at 686.
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 53(3)(b)-(d).
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comparative analysis of the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) with the European Union (EU).
B. REASONS FOR USING THE EU AND WAEMU AS A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
1. The European Union
The success of the EU common market and monetary union makes an
ECOWAS comparison with the EU significant. Under the 1993 Revised
Treaty, 57 ECOWAS aimed to establish a common market and a monetary
union. 58 The EU attained a common market through a carefully de-
signed legal and institutional framework 59 governing its operation.
ECOWAS adopted the institutional arrangement of the EU in many
respects. 6o
2. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
The comparison of WAEMU and ECOWAS is significant for three rea-
sons. First, the WAEMU is comprised of the francophone block of the
ECOWAS and, like the EU, has been successful in achieving a monetary
union. An assessment of why one block within ECOWAS is successful in
its regional efforts, yet the main group unsuccessful, is significant.
Second, the 1994 WAEMU Treaty, like the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty,
aimed to establish a common market. A comparison of the two institu-
tions is instructive in determining the extent to which their institutional
framework contributed to their success. 61
Third, a comparison with WAEMU is significant because ECOWAS
also has a long-term goal to establish a single monetary union arrange-
ment in the whole region of West Africa.62 Therefore, successful opera-
tion of the WAEMU monetary union arrangement is significant to the
design and institutional preparations for an ECOWAS-wide monetary
union.
57. Id.
58. Id. arts. 3(2)(d), 55(1), at 666-67, 687, for Common Market and Monetary Union,
respectively.
59. Set out in both the EC Treaty, and its subsequent amendments.
60. World Bank Report, supra note 33, at 6. Cf. Rosa M. Lastra, West African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Integration 4 (Aug. 3, 1992) (unpublished memorandum, on
file with author). It is argued that the application of a particular model of eco-
nomic integration to any group of countries would be a misconception because
regional integration in any group of countries varies with respect to the differences
in their historical, political, economical, and geographical experiences, thus making
the application of a particular model unviable.
61. However, it should be kept in mind that WAEMU's history did not follow the
stages for economic integration as propounded by economists. BELA A. BALASSA,
TuE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (Greenwood Press Publishers 1961),
notes that the stages leading to an economic and monetary first starts with the
establishment of a Free-trade area, Customs union, Common Market, Economic
and Monetary Union, and Political Union. The WAEMU first started as a mone-
tary union and it was only after this that an economic union was proposed.
62. ECOWAS Treaty 1993, supra note 35, art. 55(1)(iii), at 687.
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C. ECOWAS INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES: THE EU COMPARISON
1. The Common Market Agenda as a Point of Comparison
The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty did not aim to establish a common market.
This aim appeared, for the first time, in the 1993 Revised Treaty.63 This
was not the case in the EU. The aim of the European Community (EC)64
at its inception was to establish a common market among the then EC
Member States.65 The European Community Treaty (ECT) provided
very clear legal objectives to this effect. This section provides a compara-
tive assessment between the ECOWAS and EU attainment of their com-
mon market objectives, particularly, the role of regional enforcement
institutions.
2. Member States' Legal Obligations as a point of Comparison
As discussed above, the failure of 1975 ECOWAS Treaty was largely
due to the failure of Member States to comply with treaty provisions
targeted at removing administrative obstacles to the common market. In
the ensuing sections, an assessment of the clarity of Member States' legal
obligations will be considered in determining the extent to which it is
linked to their failure to comply.
a. Legal Failures: The Status of Legislative Instruments in Member
States and the Concepts of Direct Effect and Direct
Applicability
Article 249 of the ECT set forth the types of community legislative
instruments that existed and their effect in Member States. These legisla-
tive instruments included regulations, directives, decisions, recommenda-
tions, and opinions. Regulations had general application, were binding in
their entirety, and were directly applicable in all Member States.66 Direc-
tives were binding on states as to the purpose to be achieved, but did not
mandate the means of achieving the stipulated goal.6 7 Decisions were
binding only on those to whom they were addressed. 68 Recommendations
and opinions were not binding.69
The development of significant concepts also clarified the effect of
these ECT provisions on Member States. Such concepts included "direct
applicability" and "direct effect." Direct applicability, mentioned in re-
spect to regulations, meant that such provisions did not need to be passed
by the national legislature of a Member State before having binding ef-
fect. Direct effect was not mentioned in the treaty, but was purely devel-
63. Id. art. 3(2)(d), at 666-67.
64. TREATY ESTABLISHNG THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C340) 3
(1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
65. Id. arts. 2-3.
66. Id. art. 249(2).
67. Id. art. 249(3).
68. Id. art. 249(4).
69. Id.
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oped by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Provisions deemed as
having direct effect allowed citizens of Member States to enforce their
rights under ECT law in national courts. This further enhanced the rec-
ognition and enforcement of ECT law in Member States.
Unlike the ECT, the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty did not provide the status
of ECOWAS legal instruments. The two types of legal instruments men-
tioned in the 1975 Treaty were decisions and directions of the Authority
of Heads of States. The Authority of Heads of States is the highest insti-
tution of the ECOWAS community and under the 1975 Treaty, their deci-
sions and directions were binding on all institutions of the community.70
Although the 1975 Treaty made no mention of the effect of these legal
instruments on Member States, it stipulated that accession to the commu-
nity was based on the ratification of the treaty.71 However, ratification of
the treaty proved irrelevant without implementation in Member States.
The major drawback of the 1975 Treaty was its failure to specify the
binding effect of its ECOWAS provisions. The 1993 Revised Treaty was
passed to ameliorate this drawback. The Revised Treaty attempted to
specify the binding effect of ECOWAS provisions, but such attempts
proved irrelevant without adequate enforcement mechanisms. The lack
of adequate enforcement mechanisms inevitably lead to the failure of
compliance by Member States.
3. Institutional Failures: Comparison Between the ECJ and the
ECOWAS Tribunal
The ECJ plays a significant role in the functioning of the EU as the
institution that interprets and enforces primary and secondary legislation
of the EU. The ECJ jurisprudence, no doubt, contributes significantly to
the general body of community law.
Article 177 of the ECT defines the function of the ECJ, and states that
the ECJ will have the power to interpret ECT provisions where national
courts or tribunals refer cases to it. The very essence of this provision,
the various referrals of landmark cases 72 to the Court, and the subsequent
implementation of ECJ's interpretation in national jurisdictions, proclaim
the supremacy of EU Law. In the first landmark case where the
supremacy of the EU was questioned, the Court stated, "...[T]he Com-
munity constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within lim-
ited fields. ' '73 This statement was a clear pronouncement of the
supremacy of EU law by the ECJ and a clear justification of the doctrine
of supranationality.
70. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 5(3), 1010 U.N.T.S. at 21.
71. Id. art. 1(2), at 20.
72. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963
E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
73. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 1, § II(B).
504 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty did not contain a provision to develop the
supremacy and supranationality of ECOWAS as a regional group. The
1975 ECOWAS Treaty simply provided for the establishment of a Tribu-
nal of the Community.
The only provision governing the Tribunal required the observance of
law and justice in the interpretation of the 1975 Treaty. Article 56 of the
Treaty stated that this function only applied where disputes between
Member States were unresolved by direct agreement. No provision ex-
isted for the preliminary referral of disputes to the Tribunal. The referral
by a Member State party to the Tribunal was a last resort. The fact that
disputes requiring the interpretation of the 1975 Treaty can be resolved
by direct agreement opens the door to erroneous interpretations by par-
ties. This consequence leads to the erroneous applications of such provi-
sions and eventually questions the need for such a Tribunal, making its
existence largely redundant. Based on these facts, the Tribunal's failure
to establish a body of jurisprudence before the 1993 revision is not
surprising.
D. ECOWAS FROM 1993 TO PRESENT (THE REVISED TREATY)
1. Comparison of the 1975 and 1993 Treaties: Emphasis on Legal
Aspects of ECOWAS
The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty was revised in 1993. The 1993 Revised
Treaty placed emphasis on the legal aspects of ECOWAS, which the 1975
Treaty clearly omitted. Perhaps the first notable legal change is in article
3(2)(h) of the 1993 Revised Treaty, which states the aims and objectives
of the treaty. This provision states, "In order to achieve the aims... and
in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Community
shall, by stages, ensure. the establishment of an enabling legal
environment. 74
This provision sought to create an enabling legal environment by clari-
fying the status of treaty provisions in Member States, as well as making
changes in the regional enforcement mechanisms.
a. Clarifying the Status of Treaty Provisions in Member States
The Treaty clarified the status of the ECOWAS Treaty and instruments,
filling one of the vacuums of the 1975 Treaty, with respect to decisions of
the Authority of the Heads of State and regulations of the Counsel of
Ministers. The first notable change to the Treaty is the definition of
ECOWAS law in Member States. While the 1975 Treaty failed to men-
tion the status of any decisions of the Authority of the Heads of States on
Member States, the 1993 provision clearly states that the decisions of the
Authority shall be binding on the Member States and the institutions of
the community.75
74. ECOWAS Treaty 1993, supra note 35, art. 3(2)(h), 35 I.L.M. at 667.
75. Id. art. 9(4), at 669.
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In addition, the decisions of the Council of Ministers are binding on the
institutions under its authority. Decisions are also binding on Member
States after their approval by the Authority of the Heads of States.76 This
new provision clearly stipulated that regulations were binding on Mem-
ber States. Under the 1975 Treaty, ECOWAS secondary provisions were
only binding on institutions of ECOWAS, not Member States. 77 The ac-
tual application of this provision will not be known until the Court be-
comes fully operational.
b. Changes in the Enforcement Mechanism Institution: The Court
of Justice
The next notable change concerns the institutions of ECOWAS. Most
notably, a Community Court of Justice 78 was established. This Court
took on the functions of the Tribunal referred to in part III(C)(3)
above. 79 Judgments of the Court were binding on Member States, institu-
tions of ECOWAS, individuals, and corporate bodies.80  A protocol
stated that the Court could hear disputes between Member States, as well
as between Member States and community institutions on the interpreta-
tion and application of the Treaty. 81 Also, Member States may, on behalf
of nationals, initiate proceedings against Member States or community
institutions relating to the interpretation and application of 1993 Revised
Treaty provisions. 82 However, the ECOWAS Council of ministers, re-
cently adopted amendments to the 1993 ECOWAS treaty granting
ECOWAS citizens the right to bring actions before the ECOWAS
Court.83 This came after the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
a case brought against Nigeria for breaching ECOWAS Treaty provisions
on the free movement of goods. In this case, a Nigerian businessman
claimed that Nigeria's unilateral closure of its borders with the Benin Re-
public was in breach of ECOWAS Treaty provisions and as such was un-
lawful. He also claimed that his business had suffered tremendous loss
from the closure and therefore sought compensation for his loss.84 This
amendment to the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty by the Council of Ministers
would first need to be ratified by the Authority of the Head of States
76. Id. art. 12(3), at 670-71.
77. See ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, art. 5(3), 1010 U.N.T.S. at 21. See also
discussion supra Parts III.C.2.a.
78. ECOWAS Treaty 1993, supra note 35, art. 6(1)(e), 35 I.L.M. at 668.
79. Id. art. 76(1)-(2), at 692.
80. Id. art. 15(4), at 671.
81. ECOWAS Protocol A/P1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice, July 6, 1991,
art. 9(2), available at http://www.court.ecowas.int/en/court-ofjustice.htm [herein-
after CCJ Protocol].
82. Id. art. 9(3).
83. Press Release, ECOWAS, Council of Ministers Endorses Expansion of ECOWAS
Court's Powers (July 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/presse/en/
presseshow.php?nb=56&lang=en&annee=2004.
84. For more on this case, see Lillian Okenwa, Seme Border: ECOWAS Court Rules on
Locus Standi April 27, THIS DAY NIGERIAN NEWSPAPER, May 23, 2004, available
at http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/02/18/20040218newsO6.html.
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before taking effect. As a result, the ECOWAS Treaty as it stands cannot
be said to have direct effect, as is the case under EU law.
The 1993 Revised Treaty further stated that the functions of the Court
were to be carried out with independence from Member States and insti-
tutions of the community. 85 However, the composition of the Court was
still determined by the Authority of the Heads of States, who appointed
them. 86 In addition, the Authority of the Heads of States retained au-
thority to confer future powers to the Court by way of a protocol.87
These positions question whether the 1993 Revised Treaty successfully
secured the independence of the Court. However, this matter may only
be assessed after the Court becomes fully operational.
In addition to the Court of Justice, an Arbitration Tribunal is to be
established.8 8 The Treaty is silent as to what the Arbitration Tribunal's
functions are. Although, it states that these will be outlined in a proto-
col,89 no protocol exists. Also, possible overlap between the functions of
the Arbitration Tribunal and those of the Court of Justice is a matter of
concern.
Although the 1993 Treaty strengthened the Court of Justice, the Court
may be a "toothless bulldog" if it cannot get Member States to comply
with its decisions. The failure of the 1975 Treaty to have binding force led
to lack of compliance by Member States, which constituted a major pitfall
to its goals. The 1993 Revised Treaty changes this position by clarifying
the binding effect of ECOWAS provisions. However, these provisions
have not yet been applied in practice.
The 1993 Revised Treaty grants the Court of Justice the ability to de-
velop ECOWAS law as a supreme body of law. However, it is still too
soon to tell if the same outcome as in the EC will be achieved. Time will
be the best judge of the Court's effectiveness. Eleven years after the
treaty was revised, the ECOWAS Court is still not fully functional. Evi-
dence suggests that Member States continue to breach ECOWAS Treaty
provisions.90
c. Significance of Effective Regional Enforcement Mechanism: EU
and ECOWAS Comparison
The ECJ has been instrumental in the development of the European
common market and the integration process in general. The ECJ pro-
moted the integration process by ruling against barriers to the free move-
85. ECOWAS Treaty 1993, supra note 35, art. 15(3), 35 I.L.M. at 671.
86. CCJ Protocol, supra note 81, art. 3.
87. Id. art. 9(4).
88. Id. art. 16(1).
89. Id. art. 16(2).
90. ECOWAS website, supra note 22.
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ment provisions. 91 This stance is seen in cases such as Van Dyn92 and
Rutili,93 where the Court ruled against restrictions to free movement of
persons imposed by Member States. Also, in cases like Reyners94 and
Van Binsergen,95 the Court enhanced the integration process by ruling
against obstacles to the free movement of services.
With respect to the free movement of goods, the ECJ played an even
more active role. In Cassis de Dijon,96 the ECJ ruled that a Member
State measure was "equivalent to a quantitative restriction," and violated
the free movement of goods provision.97
This promotion of integration by the ECOWAS Tribunal was incon-
ceivable. The Tribunal was unable to attack blatant breaches by Member
States to the free trade arrangement, let alone ensure that the common
market provisions were enforced. The ECOWAS Tribunal played no sig-
nificant role in the building of the ECOWAS common market.
91. This process is known as negative integration, as opposed to positive integration,
which is the harmonization of standards to be complied with by Member States.
92. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (where the ECJ ruled
that article 48(1)-(2), which addressed the free movement of workers, imposed a
precise obligation and left the community and Member States authorities no dis-
cretion as to implementation).
93. Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior,1975 E.C.R. 1219.
94. Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631 (where the ECJ ruled that
the free movement of services provision under articles 59 and 60 had direct effect).
95. Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van De Bedrijfsvereniging, 1974 E.C.R.
1299 (where the ECJ ruled that the free movement of services provision under
articles 59 and 60 had direct effect).
96. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
97. EC TREATY art. 30. The Court went on to develop the notion of positive integra-
tion. See supra note 91. It achieved this by stating where goods were lawfully dis-
tributed and marketed in Member States (having complied with all regulatory
standards), they were to be accepted for distribution in other Member States. It
thus advocated that the existence of harmonised community standards would pre-
vent Member States from enforcing regulatory restrictions. In doing so, it at-
tempted to fill the lacuna of negative EC legislation, which had previously been
the method used for EU integration. It was the extended view of negative integra-
tion, see supra note 91, given by the ECJ that allowed the Commission scope to
propose the new approach. This manifested itself in the Commission's Communi-
cation to the Council and Parliament setting out a new approach to standardiza-
tion policy. Council Res. 85/C 136/01 on New Approach to Technical
Harmonization and Standards, 1985 O.J. (C136) 1-9, available at http://europa.eu.
int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod !CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&
numdoc=31985Y0604(01)&model=guichett; Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final
[hereinafter Completing the Internal Market]. These provisions were reflected in
the Single European Act, which amended the previous status quo and set a dead-
line for completing the internal market by December 31, 1992. Under article 100 of
the EC Treaty, unanimity was required in the Council before harmonisation direc-
tives could be passed. Under this amendment, article 100a introduced by the SEA,
unanimity was changed to a qualified majority in the council for passing the
harmonisation directive. This change occurred in order that the deadline for at-
taining the internal market by December 1992 would be met. EC TREATY art. 8(a)
(inserted by the Single European Act 1987).
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d. Role of Domestic Institutions for Effective ECOWAS Regional
Enforcement Mechanism
Since the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993, little has been
achieved in terms of establishing a fully operational common market. As
seen above, the TLS is a slow process and the proposed customs union is
still a distant reality. Restrictions to the free movement of persons,
goods, and services remain. The failure to achieve these objectives has
been the result of non-compliance by Member States. The establishment
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the creation of new enforcement roles
for Specialized Technical Commissions, and the clarification of the status
of ECOWAS instruments in Member States have not helped in achieving
compliance.
The failure to achieve the various components of the common market
objective reveals that ECOWAS regional arrangements cannot operate
without the active involvement of Member State institutions.
The smooth operation of the colonial regional integration regimes but-
tresses the role of domestic institutions in a regional integration arrange-
ment.98 Although colonial West African regional efforts existed under an
organized regional legal framework, their success and operation was not
solely the result of adequate regional frameworks. Their success was
equally due to the constitutional framework for imperial governance. As
such, the existence of regional ECOWAS infrastructures alone cannot
achieve the aims of ECOWAS. The need for adequate institutional and
legal infrastructures at the domestic level is vital. Domestic institutions,
such as effective legal and judicial systems in Member States, are pivotal
to the success of the ECOWAS Court. These structures will determine
Member State compliance.
E. ECOWAS INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES: THE WAEMU COMPARISON
1. WAEMU Institutional Arrangement
The WAEMU originally started out as a monetary union known as the
West African Monetary Union (WAMU), which was governed by the
West African Monetary Union Treaty of 1962. 99 This colonial monetary
arrangement determined the currency of the francophone West African
states (the CFA Franc), to be the then French Franc. These states re-
tained this arrangement even after independence. This arrangement was
successful in helping to achieve price stability within the francophone
states, averting the inflation crises that affected the economies of the an-
glophone states since their independence in the 1960s.100 It also helped
sustain the CFA convertibility within the Franc zone. In 1994, WAMU
98. See Akinrinsola, supra note 2 (providing a detailed and analytical assessment of
legal frameworks for the operation of West African regional economic integration
efforts in the colonial era).
99. This treaty was amended in 1973.
100. David Buchan and Leslie Crawford, IMF persuades French Africa to for growth,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at A4.
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was changed to WAEMU, as the failure to coordinate economic policies
led to the devaluation of the common currency. l01
The aim of establishing WAEMU 102 was to strengthen economic coor-
dination and convergence among WAMU Member States, 10 3 and prevent
devaluation from occurring in the future. °4 This objective was to be
achieved through the development of a common market. 105 The common
market would involve the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital.10 6 The market would also include a common external tariff and
trade policy among members, 1' 7 embracing the common market defini-
tion of the EU. l0 8 A second aim of WAEMU was to strengthen the en-
forcement mechanism of the WAMU. 10 9
2. Challenges of WAEMU and the ECOWAS Comparison: Common
Market Objectives
In the 1994 Treaty, WAEMU was given similar goals as ECOWAS for
the development of a common market.'10 Member States were to re-
move obstacle to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital.
a. The Free Movement of Goods
With respect to the free movement of goods, Member States were to
eliminate the following: (1) customs duties; (2) quantitative restrictions;
(3) taxes with equivalent effect; and (4) other measures having equivalent
effect on intra-regional trade.11' However, to date, intra-regional trade
remains poor in the region.112 Intra-WAEMU trade continues to face
101. See id; AID AND REFORM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM TEN CASE STUDIES (David
Dollar et. al. eds., World Bank 2001); David Stasavage, The CFA Franc Zone and
Fiscal Discipline, 6 J. OF AFR. ECON. 132, 134 (1997).
102. Treaty Establishing the West African Economic and Monetary Union, 1994 (Origi-
nal version of this Treaty was in French. The English version can be found in the
African Department of the IMF). [hereinafter WAEMU Treaty].
103. Id. art 4.
104. Buchan & Crawford, supra note 100, at A4. Mr. Camdessus, the IMF Managing
Director at the time, stated that the devaluation was meant to lead to genuine
economic convergence.
105. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 4(c).
106. Id. arts. 4(c), 76.
107. Id.
108. EC TREATY arts. 2-3.
109. Supplementary Protocol No. I of the 1994 WAEMU Treaty, art. 1, at 1 [hereinafter
WAEMU Treaty Supplementary Protocol].
110. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 4(c).
111. Id. art. 76(a).
112. JEAN CLFMENT, FT AL., AFTERMATH OF THE CFA FRANC DEVALUATION 40 (IMF,
Occasional Paper No. 138, 1996), states that between 1990 and 1993, the intra CFA
Franc Zone exports for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal,
and Togo averaged 8%, 8.5%, 17.6%, 3%, 3.3%, 14%, and 6.9%, while their im-
ports averaged 5.5%, 24.5%, 1.7%, 22.9%, 12.9%, 9.7%, and 11.7%, respectively.
The high intra CFA Franc Zone import levels recorded by Mali and Burkina Faso
are likely due to their landlocked geographical location. The IMF notes that there
have been slight improvement to this, but intra-regional trade barriers still exist.
WAEMU: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND REGIONAL POLICY ISSUES 21
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numerous non-tariff barriers, such as: (1) national standards; (2) quantita-
tive restrictions on certain imports; (3) discriminatory treatment of na-
tional and regional products; and (4) other roadblocks. Also, some
countries impose taxes that are outside the scope of the customs union
arrangement, including a verification tax in three countries, national sur-
taxes on rice, millet, and maize in one country, and a database fee in
another country. 113 Thus, like ECOWAS Member States, WAEMU
states still impose measures that hinder trade among themselves.
With a goal of attaining a common market, the Member States were
also to pursue the gradual establishment of a Common External Tariff
(CET).114 Member States continue to fail to effectively implement the
CET provisions, which were adopted in 2000.115 With the exception of
Guinea-Bissau, all countries have tariff lines that are not in conformity
with the CET nomenclature, and six countries have more tariff lines than
are permitted under the CET.' 16 In relation to safeguard measures, three
countries still apply the Digressive Protection Tax (DPT) and one country
(Cote d'Ivoire) does not apply the decline in rates according to sched-
ule." 7 Five countries' 18 apply reference values on a short list of products
elaborated by the WAEMU Commission. 1 9 In assessing the perform-
ance of WAEMU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stressed that
non-conformity to the CET and the application of reference prices in-
crease the cost of trade transactions and are likely to produce trade diver-
sion.' 20 Considering that these were some of the circumstances leading to
the devaluation of 1994, WAEMU states require a more disciplined ap-
proach to complying with their regional agreements. Without such com-
pliance, the economic union goal of WAEMU will not be accomplished,
as is the case in ECOWAS.
b. The Free Movement of Persons and Services
Other aspects of the common market include the implementation of
the free flow of persons,121 freedom of establishment, 122 and freedom to
provide services.' 23 Obstacles still exist to the free movement of persons
and services.' 24 Travel from certain states within WAEMU still requires
(IMF, Country Report No. 03/70, 2003) [hereinafter IMF WAEMU Country
Report].
113. IMF WAEMU Country Report, supra note 112, at 21.
114. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 91(1).
115. IMF WAEMU Country Report, supra note 112, at 21; World Bank Report, supra
note 33, at 22.
116. IMF WAEMU Country Report, supra note 112, at 21.
117. The three countries include Burkina Faso, Cote D' Ivoire, and Senegal. The TDP
was to be phased out by the end of 2002.
118. The five countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal.
119. IMF WAEMU Country Report, supra note 112, at 21.
120. Id.
121. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 91(1).
122. Id. art. 92(1).
123. Id. art. 93.
124. ECOWAS website, supra note 22; World Bank Report, supra note 33, at 10.
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bribery at country borders. 125
c. The Free Movement of Capital
Progress has been made with respect to the free movement of capi-
tal,126 which is required for the development of the regional capital mar-
ket.127 The legal and operational framework for the free movement of
capital has been in place since 2001.128 The regional capital market is
currently in operation and the WAEMU governments started issuing se-
curities in 2001.
Although, progress was made in the development of the regional capi-
tal market, a full-fledged common market and economic union cannot be
attained without full compliance with WAEMU provisions on the free
movement of goods, persons, and services.
3. Member States' Legal Obligations as a Point of Comparison
The failure of the common market objectives is the result of non-com-
pliance by Member States, as was the case in ECOWAS. Non-compli-
ance may be linked to the failure of the 1994 WAEMU Treaty to clearly
specify the legal obligations of Member States. This section compares the
treaty obligations of WAEMU and ECOWAS Member States and consid-
ers whether the clarity of these obligations determines Member State
compliance with common market provisions.
a. Legal Failures: Status of WAEMU Legislative Instruments in
Member States and the ECOWAS Comparison
The WAEMU Treaty preamble identifies a need to enhance the mone-
tary union through new transfers of sovereignty and authority to the
WAEMU. One method of achieving WAEMU sovereignty was by ac-
cording its provisions primacy in Member States. Article 43, which is an
exact mirror of article 249 of the ECT, outlines the status of the different
types of WAEMU provisions in Member States. These provisions include
treaty supplementary instruments, 129 passed by the Conference of Heads
of Government, regulations, directives, and decisions. 130 As is the case in
the EU, 13 1 regulations are directly applicable in Member States. Direc-
125. UCHE, supra note 7, at 28. Uche states that a bribe payment of 300 CFA Franc is
required for land border crossing from Benin to Togo, even for those with valid
travel documents.
126. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 95 (stating the provisions on the free move-
ment of capital); IMF WAEMU Country Report, supra note 112, at 16 (providing
evidence of progress in the free movement of capital).
127. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 76(b)-(d).
128. IMF WAEMU Country Report, supra note 112, at 16.
129. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 19, states that supplementary treaty instru-
ments shall be appended to the treaty. They were to complement the treaty with-
out amending it and organs of WAEMU and Member States were required to
comply with them.
130. Id. art. 42.
131. EC TREATY art. 249 (ex. 189).
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tives are binding on Member States in respect to the results to be
achieved and decisions are binding on the states to whom they are ad-
dressed. These provisions did not exist in the WAMU treaty.132
The WAEMU Treaty definition of the status and effect of WAEMU
instruments in Member States is contrary to the position in ECOWAS.
The 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty only stipulates that ECOWAS instru-
ments are binding on Member States. The absence of an effective en-
forcement mechanism has since made this provision ineffective. As noted
above, specifying the effect of EU secondary instruments in Member
States ensured that those instruments were accorded the right status.
However, this process was enabled by the EU enforcement institutions
effective monitoring of cases of non-implementation of these provisions.
The next section assesses how the WAEMU Treaty definition of the sta-
tus of WAEMU instruments in Member States enhanced their applica-
tion, particularly, the effectiveness of the WAEMU Court.
a. Institutional Failures: Comparison of the WAEMU and
ECOWAS Enforcement Institutions
The WAEMU Treaty established the WAEMU Court of Justice as an
enforcement mechanism under the WAEMU arrangement. 133 Under this
provision, the Court of Justice is the forum of litigation regarding cases of
non-compliance by Member States under both the monetary union and
economic union constitutional provisions. 134
The Court of Justice ensures compliance with the law in the interpreta-
tion and application of the WAEMU Treaty.135 However, like the case of
ECOWAS, since its establishment in 1995, the Court of Justice has been
ineffective in enforcing the common market provisions of WAEMU.
The WAEMU Treaty also states that the Court of Justice may issue
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of treaty provisions or
instruments in the event of a dispute in a national court. 136 Under this
procedure, national courts are required to refer such matters to the
WAEMU Court of Justice. 137 This provision differs from the 1993 Re-
vised ECOWAS Treaty, which does not have a provision for the prelimi-
nary referral of cases by national courts to the ECOWAS Court of Justice
132. WAEMU Treaty, supra note 102, art. 42.
133. Id. arts. 113-115.
134. Id. art. 113(3). Article 113(3), which amended article 4 of the West African Mone-
tary Union Treaty of 1973, adds a new paragraph to article 4, stating, "In accor-
dance with the procedure provided in art 6 of Supplementary Protocol No. I, the
Court of Justice of the Union shall have jurisdiction to hear cases of non-compli-
ance by Member States with obligations incumbent on them by virtue of the Treaty
of the Union. If a member who has not fulfilled its obligations fails to comply with
the request provided for in Article 6 of such protocol, the Conference of Chiefs of
State and Heads of Government shall acknowledge the withdrawal of such a State
by unanimous vote of Heads of State and Government of the other Member States
of the Union."
135. WAEMU Treaty Supplementary Protocol, supra note 109, art. 1, at 1.
136. Id. art. 12, at 3-4.
137. Id.
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in the event of a dispute relating to the interpretation of treaty provisions.
These WAEMU provisions, which were transplanted from the ECT, are
still not in operation. Although these provisions, unlike the ECOWAS
Treaty, carved a supreme status for the WAEMU Court of Justice within
national judicial systems, the results are similar to ECOWAS.
As in the case of ECOWAS,1 38 the existence of effective domestic legal
and judicial systems, which give effect to regional treaty provisions and
ensure that such provisions are enforced domestically, are pivotal to the
successful operation of the regional enforcement mechanism. If treaty
provisions are effectively recognized by domestic legal and judicial sys-
tems, then the burden on the regional enforcement mechanism is
lessened.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN PRE-INDEPENDENCE AND
POST-INDEPENDENCE WEST AFRICAN
ECONOMIC EFFORTS
The currency regime in British colonial West Africa was the first eco-
nomic integration effort in West Africa dating back from the colonial era.
The WACB operated under a comprehensive legal and institutional
framework. 139 The authority of the currency regime derived from the co-
lonial constitution that empowered the imperial government to adminis-
ter a currency regime of the West African colonies. After independence,
regional economic integration was completely different.
The comparison between integration efforts before and after indepen-
dence is not a comparison of equals for two reasons. First, the regional
framework for integration during the colonial era was designed for the
colonies without their input. The responsibility of the colonies to comply
with and operate within this framework rested with their colonial govern-
ments, which were a part of and accountable to the imperial government.
Thus, the colonial British West African currency system was not a truly
regional economic integration arrangement. Instead, the arrangement
was put in place by the imperial state to consolidate the currency adminis-
tration of its colonies. So, although the legal framework for its operation
is instructive 140 for a future West African economic integration, it cannot
be used as a yardstick for post-colonial regional economic integration.
Second, compliance with the colonial regional framework was not an
issue under the colonial government, unlike compliance for Member
States after independence. The reason for this is that under the British
colonial constitution, the imperial government fully controlled colonial
institutions, including their currency regime. The transfer of economic
and monetary sovereignty on the eve of independence meant that any
regional integration effort after independence required the Member
138. ECOWAS Treaty 1975, supra note 10, arts. 12-13, 1010 U.N.T.S. at 24-25.
139. The Regulation defining the constitution and powers of the West African Currency
Board.
140. UZOAGA, supra note 4, at 49.
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States' volition to comply. Without this willingness, the regional effort
was bound to fail, as has been the case in ECOWAS.
The francophone states, on the other hand, preserved their colonial
monetary arrangement after the signing of the WAMU Treaty, stating
their desire to retain the system after independence.
The successful operation of colonial regional integration arrangements,
such as WACB and WAMU, and the subsequent failure of integration
arrangements along these lines after independence, in the creation of
ECOWAS and WAEMU, speaks volumes. Although the existence of
strong regional institutional frameworks was pivotal to the success of the
colonial regional integration effort, it was not the only reason for success.
The existence of institutions guaranteeing the compliance of the colonies
with the regional framework, which was entrenched in the colonial consti-
tutions, ensured the smooth operation of these regional regimes. 141
In the same manner, the existence of domestic institutions adequately
secured in the constitutions of Member States will determine whether re-
gional institutional arrangements will attain the goals of economic inte-
gration. The domestic institutions required for the effective functioning
of the economic regional integration arrangement include the existence
of effective legal and judicial systems that recognize and can enforce the
regional integration arrangement domestically. Without this, regional ec-
onomic integration among independent states is not likely to succeed.
V. CONCLUSION
The existence of an effective regional legal and institutional framework
has been a factor that has contributed to the success of the EU. The
existence of such a framework appears to have made the WACB success-
ful. This is particularly true in a comparison between the successes of
regional efforts in the colonial era and the challenges of such efforts after
independence. The case of the WAMU reinforces this point. Although
WAMU was successful for a long period, its success was linked to its colo-
nial heritage. The WAEMU, which was designed to address the inade-
quacies of WAMU by introducing an economic agenda and a more
sophisticated regional framework, still faces major challenges. These out-
comes reveal that the success of WAMU was not determined by regional
structures alone. The legal and institutional challenges of both WAEMU
and ECOWAS show that the effectiveness of a regional structure is de-
pendent on domestic compliance. Without the existence of adequate do-
mestic legal and institutional infrastructures, domestic compliance can
hardly be attained, making the regional economic arrangement unwork-
able. As such, the existence of an adequate legal and institutional infra-
structure at both regional and domestic levels is crucial to the success of
any West African economic integration effort.
141. Akinrinsola, supra note 2, at 23.
